A coalition formation value for games with externalities

The coalition formation problem in an economy with externalities can be adequately modeled by using games in partition function form (PFF games), proposed by Thrall and Lucas. If we suppose that forming the grand coalition generates the largest total surplus, a central question is how to allocate the worth of the grand coalition to each player, i.e., how to find an adequate solution concept, taking into account the whole process of coalition formation. We propose in this paper the original concepts of scenario-value, process-value and coalition formation value, which represent the average contribution of players in a scenario (a particular sequence of coalitions within a given coalition formation process), in a process (a sequence of partitions of the society), and in the whole (all processes being taken into account), respectively. We give an application to Cournot oligopoly, and two axiomatizations of the scenario-value.Coalition formation, games in partition function form, solution concept, Cournot oligopoly.

Collinearity between the Shapley value and the egalitarian division rules for cooperative games

For each cooperativen-person gamev and eachh∈{1, 2, ⋯,n}, letv h be the average worth of coalitions of sizeh andv h i the average worth of coalitions of sizeh which do not contain playeri∈N. The paper introduces the notion of a proportional average worth game (or PAW-game), i.e., the zero-normalized gamev for which there exist numbersc h ∈ℝ such thatv h −v h i =c h (v n−1−v n −1/i ) for allh∈{2, 3, ⋯,n−1}, andi∈N. The notion of average worth is used to prove a formula for the Shapley value of a PAW-game. It is shown that the Shapley value, the value representing the center of the imputation set, the egalitarian non-separable contribution value and the egalitarian non-average contribution value of a PAW-game are collinear. The class of PAW-games contains strictly the class ofk-coalitional games possessing the collinearity property discussed by Driessen and Funaki (1991). Finally, it is illustrated that the unanimity games and the landlord games are PAW-games

Measuring the Response to Housing Energy Labels in Japan by Using an Eye-Tracking Experiment.

金沢大学人間社会研究域経済学経営学系This study focuses on energy labels, which are set to be displayed mandatorily in Japanese real estateadvertisements soon. In this study, we conducted eye-tracking experiments to identify effective designelements for energy labels. The novelty of this study lies in the fact that we not only collected data onreaction times and areas of interest (AOIs) using eye tracking, but also conducted a panel analysiscontrolling for individual effects by adding data from a questionnaire survey conducted after theexperiment. Our findings verified that the display of energy labels in real estate advertisements is likelyto lead to improved consumer understanding of energy conservation standards as learning effects. Thissuggests rehearsal effects that invited availability heuristics by appearing repeatedly. Moreover, theresults of the panel analysis suggest that design of energy labels are important on reaction time andnumber of round trips between the AOIs. We compared the two label designs in the experiment, theinformation in the European Union energy label was difficult to read and judge intuitively, and canconclude the rating scale label was more suitable for advertising and readers in Japan. As energy labelshelp with increased consumer awareness regarding energy standards of dwellings and energy saving,an early start to labeling is recommended